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Perspectives

| 2 minute read

A Continued Jurisdictional Divide at the Fifteenth Court

A jurisdictional theory first advanced in concurrence is now a holding and may divide related proceedings between the Fifteenth Court and the regional courts of appeals.

In In re Plaisance, the Fifteenth Court of Appeals recently continued its disagreement over the reach of its jurisdiction. In its June 30, 2026 opinion, a divided Court held that it could hear an interlocutory appeal transferred for docket equalization, but it could not decide a mandamus petition challenging the statutory stay in the same underlying case. The immediate dispute concerned a stay pending interlocutory appeal. The broader issue was whether jurisdiction over an appeal includes authority to address related disputes arising below.

Justice Farris’s majority opinion treated the statutes’ different language as controlling. Chapter 73 gives a court “jurisdiction” over an appeal transferred for docket equalization. But the statute governing the Fifteenth Court’s writ power limits that authority to matters within its “exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction.” The majority concluded that equalization jurisdiction, without more, doesn’t include authority to decide a related mandamus petition.

Plaisance didn’t arise on a blank slate. Three months earlier in In re Shelton, the Fifteenth Court considered an interlocutory appeal transferred for docket equalization and a mandamus petition seeking the same relief on the same grounds. Chief Justice Brister’s memorandum opinion dismissed the mandamus proceeding as moot after resolving the appeal. In a concurring opinion, Justice Farris agreed with the result but wrote separately to argue that the court should instead dismiss for lack of writ jurisdiction. In Plaisance, the Shelton concurrence's jurisdictional theory became the Court's holding.

Disagreeing with the majority, Chief Justice Brister’s dissent offered two paths to mandamus jurisdiction. First, the Fifteenth Court’s exclusive jurisdiction includes “any other matter as provided by law,” and Chapter 73 provides jurisdiction over transferred cases. Second, once an appeal is pending, the Court’s appellate authority may permit it to address trial-court orders that threaten its jurisdiction or the effectiveness of its eventual relief, without depending entirely on freestanding original jurisdiction.

Though the immediate dispute arises from docket equalization, the disagreement is broader. It reflects competing views within the Fifteenth Court about the reach of its authority—an important question as the new Court continues to define its place in Texas’s appellate system. Shelton and Plaisance show that the Court’s members don’t yet agree on how its jurisdictional grants fit together or how much authority follows when an appeal properly lands on its docket. For counsel, the result is an unsettled jurisdictional landscape in which related appellate proceedings may need to be pursued in different courts.

Key Insights

  • The Fifteenth Court is still defining the reach of its jurisdiction. The divide in Plaisance reflects competing views of how the court’s appellate and writ powers fit together as the court continues to develop.
  • Map jurisdiction proceeding by proceeding. A transferred appeal in the Fifteenth Court and a related mandamus petition may belong in different courts, even when they arise from the same trial-court case.
  • Watch disagreements, not just the results. A theory advanced in a concurrence became the Court’s holding three months later.
Our equalization jurisdiction [is] separate and distinct from our exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction.

Tags

appellate